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THE CASE FOR FEDERALIZING RULES OF
CIVIL JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITYt
Peter Hay*
I.

THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL JURISDICTION IN NON-UNIFIED FEDERAL
SYSTEMS

A.

The Rationale for Federal Limits

The European Community is an "incipient federal structure," 1 even if
its scope of operation is limited in subject matter and its creation derives
from "a network of treaties rather than [from] a formal constitution." 2 A
federal structure at once protects, even nurtures, pluralism and coordinates
the constituent units in the interest of a union. 3 Federal legislation promotes the interests of the larger unit; a limitation of powers in the constitutive document preserves the integrity of the members. In the American
federation, the United States Supreme Court defines the balance between
the reach of state and federal law. The balance, moreover, shifts over time
as new or different concerns call for accommodation. In so doing, the
Court not only deals with direct attacks on state or federal legislation or
with problems of interpretation (or gap filling) raised by new or different
concerns, but also performs a creative function. In the fashion of a common law court, it develops the law either by creating "federal common law"
or by declining to do so, in the latter case thus preserving or extending the
applicability of state law. Even when it does develop federal common law,
the Court may derive the new federal rule from state law rather than fashioning one anew.4
The Court of Justice of the European Communities renders binding decisions in direct actions challenging the validity of Community legislation
or administrative action, 5 thus contributing to the definition and develop-

t

It is with thanks and affection that I dedicate this essay to Eric Stein, who first
introduced me to European Community law when he appointed me his research assistant in
1957. His contribution to teaching and scholarship has been singular and has earned him the
respect of the profession around the world. Many of us owe him much more: for his help and
support in our personal and professional development and for his friendship over the years.
• Dean and Professor of Law, University of Illinois; Honorary Professor, University of
Freiburg i. Br., Germany. B.A., J.D. 1958, University of Michigan. The author gratefully
acknowledges the research assistance of Stefan-M. Tiessen, of Germany. - Ed.
1. Stein, Treaty-Based Federalism, A.D. 1979: A Gloss on Covey T. Oliver al the Hague
Academy, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 897,901,905 (1919);seealso P. HAY, FEDERALISM AND SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1-202passim (1966).
2. Stein, supra note 1, at 901.
3. See Hay, Full Faith and Credit and Federalism in Choice of Law, 34 MERCER L. REv.
709, 722-27 (1983). On unified versus non-unified federal systems, see id. at 724-25.
4. See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 133-48, particularly at 138-40 (1982).
5. See generally G. BEBR, DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN COM-
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ment of Community law. It can also render a preliminary ruling (under
article 177 of the EEC Treaty) 6 on the interpretation of a question of Community law when such a question is relevant to the decision of a case pending before a national court and that court has referred the question to the
Court of Justice. 7 In article 177 cases, the Court technically answers only a
question put to it for purposes of a specific case pending in another (a national) court. However, "as the case law of the European Court becomes
more abundant . . . national judges [may be expected] increasingly to follow a similar approach whether the 'precedent' is to be found in a judgment
in a 'direct action' or in a ruling of the Court under article 177."8 As in a
common law system, the Court's influence thus extends beyond the particular case; its decisions serve as sources of Community law. 9
Technically, perhaps, interpretation of a statutory text and even gap filling (the latter deriving from some pre-existing legislative action) are different from judicially declared rules of law (federal common law) in which a
court takes the initiative. This difference, however, must not be overstated.
In all cases, there must exist federal authority to adopt the statute, to extend
a statutory rule through gap filling, or to bring a subject matter within the
federal domain so that a federal rule can be fashioned for it. 10 The real
difference between federal common lawmaking in the United States and in
the Community may therefore lie in the respective extent to which there
exists authority in the first place to extend the reach of federal law.
The European Court has made some Community (federal) law, primarily in the "constitutional" area. Thus, it "discovered ... [a supremacy
clause] in the interstices of the new legal order," 11 undertook to extend the
Community's treaty-making power, 12 declared the direct effect of directives, 13 and set itself up as "guardian of fundamental rights within the
MUNITIES, Pt. 2B (1981); E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
AND INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 145-69 (1976).
6. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11 (1958) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
7. G. BEBR, supra note 5, at 366; E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, supra note 5, at
261-74.
8. Lord MacKenzie Stuart & Warner, Judicial Decision as a Source of Community Law, in
EUROPAISCHE GERICHTSBARKEIT UND NATIONALE VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT 273, 281
(W. Grewe, H. Rupp & H. Schneider eds. 1981); see also Bebr, Preliminary Rulings ofthe Court
ofJustice: Their Authority and Temporal Effect, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 475 (1981); Hartley, The Effects in National Law of Judgments of the European Court, 5 EUR. L. REV. 366
(1980).
9. Lord MacKenzie Stuart & Warner, supra note 8, at 281.
IO. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 4, at 133-37.
11. Stein, supra note I, at 902. The Court first articulated the supremacy doctrine in Costa
v. ENEL (Case No. 6/64), 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585 (Preliminary Ruling). Its most
complete statement of the doctrine is now found in Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato
v. Simmenthal S.p.A. (Case No. 106/77), 1978 Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 629 (Preliminary Ruling),
The U.S. Supreme Court similarly derives rules from the "principles of interstate federalism
embodied in the Constitution," World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,293
(1980), or, in the case of the act of state doctrine, bases the result on "'constitutional' underpinnings,'' Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
12. Stein, supra note I, at 903; see also van Houtte, International Law and Community
Treaty-Making Power, 3 Nw. J. INTL. L. & Bus. 621 (1981).
13. G. BEBR, supra note 5, at 584-88.

April/May 1984]

Federalizing Rules

ef Civil Jurisdiction

1325

Community legal order." 14 The Court's case law thus promoted the goals
of integration and the efficacy of Community law, while simultaneously
safeguarding individual rights against governmental action.
These developments are not surprising. They define and refine the relationship of the Community to its members and the role of the Court in the
constitutional framework. Once the nature of the Communities as incipient
federal structures and the notion of treaty-based federalism 15 are accepted,
it follows that Communitypublic law will evolve as in any federal structure.
Private law is the law of the individual states in the European Community, as it is for the most part 16 in the American union. An American 17 or
European common market, however, requires some coordination of private
law, that is, of the legal business that goes on in constituent states. In the
United States, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment sets
outer limits on the exercise of state court jurisdiction and on a state court's
freedom to apply local law to parties and to a cause of action with no or
only minimal connection with the forum. 18 Further, the full faith and
credit clause 19 secures the free movement of judgments rendered by a court
with proper jurisdiction.
The Community has no due process clause. It sets no standard against
which the exercise of state court jurisdiction (or the application of forum
law) may be measured and, if improper, voided.20 A "full faith and credit"
14. Id at 649; see also id at 649-57; note 96 1i!fra.
15. Stein, supra note !,passim.
16. Federal co=on lawmaking does affect some areas of private law in the United States,
see E. SCOLES & P. HAY,supra note 4, at 137-48, but does not represent a comprehensive body
of law.
17. "In the Co=erce Clause, [the framers] provided that the Nation was to be a co=on
market, a 'free trade unit' in which the States are debarred from acting as separable economic
entities." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
18. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 4, at 79-102.
19. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § l.
20. In a sense, however, the Co=unity does achieve some results essentially similar to
those that flow from the due process limitation in the United States. Thus, the Convention on
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgment in Civil and Co=ercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968,
art. 3, para. 2, BULL. EuR. COMM., Supp. 2/69, at 17 [hereinafter cited as Jurisdiction and
Recognition Convention] lists those jurisdictional rules (also known as "exorbitant" jurisdictional bases) that may no longer be invoked in order to obtain jurisdiction over defendants
domiciled within the Co=unity. Among these are jurisdiction based on the presence of
property for a claim unrelated to that property (German Code of Civil Procedure, ZPO § 23)
and the French nationality of a plaintiff suing a foreign defendant in French courts. The
Convention is in force among the original six members of the Co=unities. The Accession
Convention of 1978, 21 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 304) 1 (Oct. 30, 1978) (not yet in force),
provides for the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. Ratification will
result in the addition of a prohibition on the exercise of jurisdiction by service of process upon
a person (transient jurisdiction). On exorbitant rules of jurisdiction, see Weser, Bases ofJudicial Jurisdiction in the Common Market Countries, IO AM. J. COMP. L. 323, 324-28 (1961).
The prohibitions of article 3(2) do provide due process standards: even though contained
in an interstate recognition convention, the prohibitions of article 3(2) are domestic law in each
of the six original member states and thus bar the assertion of jurisdiction on one of the prohibited grounds even when extrastate recognition is not in issue (for instance, when there exists
local property sufficient to satisfy any judgment). Nevertheless, the prohibitions of article 3(2)
are fixed. The American due process clause - with no fixed content - is perhaps more adaptable as different needs and problems of co=unity building evolve. It is perhaps the lack of
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requirement, however, does provide that judgments rendered in the exercise
of specified jurisdictional bases are entitled to recognition and enforcement
in other Community countries.21 The proper assertion of jurisdiction thus
is not a prerequisite for in-state validity under a federal due process standard as in the United States, but it is a prerequisite for mandatory22 out-ofstate recognition.
The full faith and credit requirement is a matter of federal law in the
United States and of Community law in Europe. 23 And since the requirement of recognition and enforcement of a sister state's judgment depends
on the rendering state's proper exercise of jurisdiction, this question what makes for jurisdiction? - itself becomes a question of federal law for
recognition purposes. Were it otherwise, that is, if it were up to the individual state to specify the reach of its judicial jurisdiction, each state would be
in a position to affect and define other states' obligations to recognize and
enforce its judgments. Yet a full faith and credit requirement represents a
federal ordering of the interstate common market in judgments. It follows
that the precondition to the federal requirement cannot be left to the unilateral action of those whose relations are to be ordered and whose divergent
interests are to be accommodated.
such a general device that underlies some of the problems with the proper interpretation of
article 5(1). See text following note 40 infra.
21. See Bartlett, Fu!! Faith and Credit Comes lo the Common Markel: An Analysis of tire
Provisions ofthe Convention on Jurisdiction and E,!forcemenl ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Mallers, 24 INTL. & COMP. L. Q. 44 (1975).
22. Bilateral recognition conventions usually leave the treaty parties free also to recognize
judgments rendered on jurisdictional bases other than those provided by the convention. See,
e.g., London (July 1976) Draft of a proposed U.S.-U.K. recognition-of-judgments convention
art. 3 (not in force) reproduced in Hay & Walker, The Proposed Recognition-of-Judgments Convention Between tire United Slates and tire United Kingdom, 11 TEX. INTL. L.J. 421, 453 (1976),
In the Co=unity, the Brussels Convention proscribes specified exorbitant rules of jurisdiction (article 3), provides certain special jurisdictional bases in article 5 (e.g., for contract and
tort), and establishes specific rules for insurance (articles 7-12), credit sales (articles 13-15),
and cases of exclusive jurisdiction (article 16). Thus, there is no room for further discretionary
recognition and, as mentioned earlier, less need than in the United States for additional controls by means of a due process clause. See note 20 supra.
23. Spellenberg, .Das Europaische Gerichtsslands- und J/o!lstreckungsiJbereinkommen als
Kern eines Europaischen Zivilprozessrechls, 15 EuR 329, 339, 347 (1980), suggests that the Jurisdiction and Recognition Convention, supra note 20, does not represent "real" Community
law but rather is a traditional international treaty, the interpretation of which should respect
national interests and not intrude into concerns of national substantive law. This suggestion
accords no or too little weight to the fact that the Convention represents the implementation of
the mandate of EEC Treaty, supra note 6, art. 220, that "Member States shall •.. enter into
negotiations . . . with a view to ensuring for the benefit of their nationals: . . • the reciprocal
recognition of judicial decisions . . . ." The Convention thus is very much part of the whole
process of Co=unity building - a process that also explains why the 1971 Protocol on the
Interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments Convention, June 3, 2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 6081 [hereinafter cited as Protocol], in force
since September I, 1975 as among the six original members, confers jurisdiction on the Euro•
pean Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the Convention in a
manner akin to proceedings under EEC Treaty article 177. See note 7 supra. See also text at
notes 38-39 infra.
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B. The U.S. and the European Experience

In the United States, review of jurisdiction for full faith and credit purposes is readily understood as involving a question of federal law, 24 perhaps because review ofjurisdictiongenerallj'-i.e., on due process grounds
for in-state validity- is also an accustomed federal function. Federal review for either purpose (due process or full faith and credit) does not necessarily mean that a completely new rule will be fashioned. 25 Rather, as
mentioned earlier, an existing rule of state law may be adopted as the federal standard26 or state law may be left undisturbed - not because it "applies" of its own force but because the outer limits set by federal law as part
of its interstate ordering function have not been transgressed.27
The European Court similarly is called upon to interpret the Community's full faith and credit requirement in the interest of the uniform interpretation and application of the Jurisdiction and Recognition Convention
(in response to a referral similar to one under article 177 of the EEC
Treaty). 28 However, it has an uneven record in giving a federal meaning to
the jurisdictional prerequisites of that requirement. Thus, in tort, the Convention provides for the recognition of judgments29 rendered in the state
"where the harmful event occurred."30 The phrase was deliberately left
ambiguous in order "to overcome a fundamental disagreement whether jurisdictional competence in tort cases should be accorded to the courts of the
place where the defendant 'acted' or to those of the place where the plaintiff
sustained injury (where these lie in separate countries)."31 The ambiguity
could have been resolved by the Court in the same way in which it had
dealt with the term "performance" in the contract section (to be discussed
presently): leave it to the choice of law rules of the forum to localize the
tort and recognize the exercise of jurisdiction by the state whose substantive
law governs the tort. The result would have been - depending on the specific facts of a case - that one or two states, or even none, might have had
jurisdiction. In any event, there would not have been a Community-wide
24. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226,231 n. 7 (1945) ("Since an appeal to the
Full Faith and Credit Clause raises questions arising under the Constitution . . ., the proper
criteria for ascertaining domicile [the jurisdictional basis needed for ex parte divorce jurisdiction], . . . become matters for federal determination."); see also State ex rel White Lumber
Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Or. 121, 130,448 P.2d 571, 575 (1968) ("[O]ne form of jurisdictional allocation is found in the full faith and credit clause . . . .") (O'Connell, J., dissenting).
Cf. Wilson v. Kimble, 573 F. Supp. 501, 503 (D. Colo. 1983) (When the existence of diversity
for federal jurisdiction depended on whether the minor plaintiffs domicile derived from her
mother or her father, the determination had to be made "by reference to federal common
laws.") (citing Stifel v. Hopkins, 477 F.2d 1116, 1120 (6th Cir. 1973)).
25. See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 4, at 138-40.
26. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 729 (1979) (discussed in E.
SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 4, at 139 n.9).
27. E.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 236-37 (1945).
28. See Protocol, supra note 23.
29. The Jurisdiction and Recognition Convention, supra note 20, provides for jurisdiction
- for most personal actions - in the state of the defendant's domicile (article 2), and then
adds - for particular causes - "special" jurisdictional bases (articles 5-18).
30. Jurisdiction and Recognition Convention, supra note 20, art. 5(3).
31. l. FLETCHER, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 125 (1982).
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rule. The Court did not choose this course. Instead, it provided its own
interpretation of the provision, thus substituting a uniform rule for potentially divergent national approaches. The rule adopted does not select one
of the two possible fora to the exclusion of the other, but rather - in keeping with modem, plaintiff-favoring choice-of-law rules in tort32 - permits
the plaintiff to sue in either state.33 Similarly, the Court has developed extensive case law on the requirements of article 17 permitting parties to enter
into choice-of-court clauses,34 has held that a forum selection clause does
not mean that the parties cannot also voluntarily submit to jurisdiction elsewhere, 35 has defined quite clearly what constitutes a branch, agency, or
other dependent establishment for purposes of jurisdiction under article
5(5),36 and has brought maintenance claims between spouses within the
scope of the Convention.37
II.

THE PROBLEM ILLUSTRATED: JUDICIAL JURISDICTION IN CONTRACT

As the foregoing discussion shows, the European Court of Justice's decisions show consistent efforts to establish uniform rules of jurisdiction as
part of the mandate to accord recognition to judgments properly rendered.
The Court stated that the Convention's mandates override inconsistent national law38 - a position consistent with its view of the supremacy of the
EEC Treaty.39 It is all the more surprising, then, that the Court should
have left the jurisdictional rules relating to contract in their present uncertain state.
"
The provision at issue is article 5(1) of the Jurisdiction and Recognition
Convention, which specifies that, in addition to being subject to suit at his
32. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 4, at 605.
33. See Bier B.V. v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace S.A. (Case 21/76), 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 1735 (Preliminary Ruling); McClellan, The Convention ofBrussels of September 27, 1968
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Eeforcement ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 15 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 228, 236 (1978).
34. See McClellan, Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Eeforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters in the European Communities, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 268, 274
(1979); McClellan & Kremlis, The Convention of September 27, 1968 on Jurisdiction and Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Mallers, 20 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 529, 547
(1983). The Accession Convention of 1978 between the six original members and the three
new members, not yet in force, contains amendments to article 17 relaxing the formal requirements contained in that provision and strictly construed by the Court. See Schlosser, Report
on the Convention, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 59) 71, 124 (Mar. 5, 1979). A second Accession Convention, adding Greece, was signed in October 1982, but is also not yet in force. See
Convention on the Accession of the Hellenic Republic to the Convention on jurisdiction and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 82/972/EEC, 25 O.J. EuR. COMM,
(No L 388) l (Dec. 31, 1982); Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in
civil and commercial matters, 26 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 97) 2 (Apr. 11, 1983).
35. McClellan & Kremlis, supra note 34, at 552-53.
36. Blanckaert & Willems PVBA v. Trost (Case No. 139/80), 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
819 (Preliminary Ruling).
37. De Cavel v. De Cavel (Case No. 120/79), 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 731 (Preliminary
Ruling).
.
38. Sanicentral GmbH v. Collin (Case No. 25/79), 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3423, 3429
(Preliminary Ruling); Duijnstee v. Goderbauer (Case No. 288/82), 1984 COMMON MKT. REP,
(CCH) ~ 14,034 (Ct. J. Eur. Comm. Nov. 15, 1983), digested in 1983 ECJR 125.
39. See note 11 supra.
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domicile, 40 a defendant may also be sued, "in matters relating to a contract,
in the court for the place of performance of the obligation in question."
Since bilateral contracts will involve obligations on both sides, one interpretive problem concerns the definition of the relevant obligation. A further
question is how the "place of performance" of the relevant obligation
should be defined.
A.
1.

-what is the Relevant "Obligation"?

The Obligation at Issue in the Litigation

In DeBloos v. Bouyer, 41 the Court of Justice held that the term "obligation" in article 5(1) refers to the contractual obligation forming the basis of
the legal proceedings. It is the purpose of the Convention, the Court noted,
not to permit situations in which a number of courts have jurisdiction in
respect of one and the same contract. Thus, a forum should not have jurisdiction when. it has contact with just any obligation arising under the contract in question, but only if the obligation to be performed in the forum is
the one on which the plaintiff bases his claim.42 In DeBloos, a Belgian
distributor sought compensation in a Belgian court from his French supplier for terminating the distributorship agreement in violation of the Belgian statutory notice requirement. What is the nature of his compensation
claim: is it an "independent" (ie., primary) claim or is it ancillary to the
notice requirement? That, said the Court in DeBloos, is a matter for determination by the national court under its conflicts rules. Under French confilcts law, Belgian law was applicable to the distributorship agreement. But
Belgian law was unclear on the proper characterization of the claim, with
the result that the tie-in between "obligation" and "performance" (to be
discussed) might lead to contradictory results. If the obligation to provide
compensation is independent, it has to be performed at the debtor's (supplier's) domicile. In contrast, if it is ancillary to the main obligation to give
notice, it - like notice - should have been performed at the distributor's
domicile.43
The Court's view has been criticized on several grounds. One argument
is that splitting the contract into various obligations may bring into play the
whole range of differences among national conflicts rules, since the law applicable to the contract will determine whether an obligation is to be characterized as a primary or secondary obligation.44 National conflicts rules
with respect to the sale of goods display at least four different approaches.
40. See note 29 supra.
41. (Case No. 14/76), 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1497 (Preliminary Ruling).
42. Both the German and the Italian Codes of Civil Procedure support this interpretation.
See ZPO § 29; C.P.c. art. 20. While not determinative of the content of the "federal" standard,
agreement in national law (or state law in the United States) may obviate the need for a different federal rule. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
43. Ledoux, Les concessions de vente en Belgique et !es reg/es de competence de la CE.E. , 90
JT 217 (1975).
44. See Linke, Besondere Zustiindigkeiten: Vorbemerkungen, in DER INTERNATIONALE
RECHTSVERKEHR IN ZIVIL- UND HANDELSSACHEN § 606, at 59 (A. Billow & K.-H. Bclckstiegel
eds. 1983); Spellenberg, .Der Gerichtsstand des Erflillungsortes im Europiiischen Gerichtsstandsund Vo/!streckungsiibereinkommen, 91 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR ZIVILPROZESS 38, 51 (1978).
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In France, Belgium and Italy, the Hague Convention of June 15, 1955 is in
force which, in the absence of a contrary stipulation between the parties,
refers to the law of the seller's habitual residence as governing the obligation.45 The Netherlands refers to the law of the place of contract formation,46 the Federal Republic of Germany applies the law of the place of
performance,47 and the United Kingdom uses the proper law of the contract.48 It is thus obvious that different fora may reach different conclusions
when they consider where a "primary" obligation is to be performed. Illustratively, if the Belgian court in JJeB/oos v. Bouyer 49 had applied French
law and if French law had characterized the claim as "ancillary," Belgium
would have been the place where the principal obligation was to be performed and its courts would have jurisdiction under article 5(1). If a Belgian judge applying Belgian law were to arrive at an "independent" or
"primary" characterization, neither Belgian nor French courts would have
jurisdiction: each would consider jurisdiction to lie with the other. If one
reverses the characterization (under French law the obligation is primary,
while under Belgian law the obligation is secondary), a cumulation of
courts with article 5 jurisdiction would result. 50
Similarly, there may be multiple fora or there may be none with article
5(1) jurisdiction when money debts are involved. In Italy, 51 the Netherlands,52 and the United Kingdom, 53 a monetary obligation is to be performed at the domicile of the creditor.54 The other members - France,
Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany - provide for performance at the
debtor's domicile.55 A hypothetical may serve to illustrate: a German
45. Convention of the Law Applicable to International Sales of Goods, June 15, 1955, 510
U.N.T.S. 147 (1964). The Convention is also in force in Denmark, one of the states to accede
to the Convention.
46. 0. SANDROCK, I HANDBUCH DER INTERNATIONALEN VERTMGSGESTALTUNG 158
(1980).
47. 0. SANDROCK, supra note 46, at I 17.
48. 0. SANDROCK, supra note 46, at 171; see also Droz, L'interpretation, par la Cour de

justice des Comm11na11tes, des reg/es de competence judiciaire europeennes en matiere de contra/,
1977 DALLOZ (Chronique) 287, 292. The same rule applies in Greece. See CODE CIVIL
HELLENIQUE art. 25.
49. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
50. In its decision of May 3, 1977, the Belgian Cour d'Appel de Mons, 92 JT 637 (1977),
held that the duty to pay damages constituted an independent obligation. This would ordinarily have meant that jurisdiction lay with French courts. The Belgian court, however, affirmed
its own jurisdiction because two of the three claims involved in the action bore a relationship
to Belgium, and article 22 of the Convention permits connected claims to be decided by the
same tribunal. This approach was subsequently disapproved in Schuh GmbH v. Jacqmain
(Case No. 150/80), 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1671 (Preliminary Ruling).
51. C.c. art. 1182(3).
52. B.W. art. 1429(2).
53. See J. CHITTY, I CHITTY ON CONTRACTS ~ 1419 (25th ed. 1983).
54. The rule is the same in Denmark, Lyngsp, General Law of Obligations, in H. GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, B. GOMARD & A. PHILIP, DANISH LAW 119, 122 (1982), and probably also
in Ireland, 0. SANDROCK, supra note 46, at 180.
55. CODE CIVIL DE LA FRANCE art. 1247; CODE CIVIL BELGE art. 1247; CODE CIVIL DU
LUXEMBOURG art. 1247; BOB § 269 (W. Ger.). The rule is the same in Greece. See CODE
CIVIL HELLENIQUE art. 320. However, in Belgium, France, and Germany the Uniform Law on
the International Sale of Goods is in force, as it is also in the Netherlands and the United
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buyer sues an Italian seller in Germany for damages arising from an alleged breach of contract. Under the applicable German law, money debts
have to be paid at the debtor's domicile. German courts, therefore, do not
have jurisdiction. Italian courts also lack jurisdiction, if they apply Italian
law and conclude that money debts are to be paid at the creditor's domicile.
If, on the other hand, the German court had jurisdiction over the buyer's
claim for damages and the seller sued for the contract price in Italy, the
decision in .DeBloos56 would again result in an undesirable cumulation of
jurisdiction.
2.

The Most Characteristic Obligation

A number of authors suggest that money debts should be disregarded as
"obligations," the performance of which confers jurisdiction within the
meaning of article 5(1), precisely because money can be paid at so many
different places. A principal reason for providing for jurisdiction at the
place of performance of an obligation is the close connection between the
performance and the availability of evidence, witnesses, expert opinions,
and the like. Such a connection may not exist in the case of monetary
obligations.57
The suggestion that the obligation to pay money be excluded as a place
of performance for jurisdictional purposes is very much in tune with contemporary developments in European conflicts law, which adopt references
to the place of the "closest connection"58 or, in contract, to the place of
performance of the obligation that is characteristic of the transaction. 59
The 1980 Convention of the European Communities on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (not yet rati.fied) 60 takes the same approach.
With respect to the topic under discussion, the two approaches coincide: in
Kingdom. For cases involving transactions between parties in different member states, article
59 provides for payment at the seller's place of business or, if there is none, at his habitual
residence. See von Cammerer, Pjlichten des Kiiefers, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN
KAUFRECHT 349, 361 (H. Dolle ed. 1976).
56. See notes 41-43 & 49 supra.
57. Linke, supra note 44, § 606, at 49; Spellenberg, supra note 44, at 56; Droz, Note, 65
R.C.D.I.P. 120, 125 (1976);see also Schlechtriem,Auslegung und Liickenfollung im Internationalen Einheitsrecht: "Erflillungsort" for Rlickabwicklungspjlichten im EuGVU und EKG, 1
IPRAx 113 (1981). Schlechtriem criticizes the reference to national law on the ground that it
places an undue burden on debtors to have to bear the risk of Joss and delay in money transfers as well as to be subject to jurisdiction at the creditor's place of business. See id. at 114.
58. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 4, at 47; Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Neuregelung des
Internationalen Privatrechts, 3 IPRAx 254, 258 at art. 28(1) (1983) (German Draft Statute for
the Reformulation of Private International Law) [hereinafter cited as German Draft Statute];
Hungarian Statute on Private International Law of 1979 § 25.
59. See CODE DE PROCEDURE CIVIL art. 46 (Fr. 1976) (jurisdiction at the place of the
characteristic obligation); German Draft Statute, supra note 58, art. 28(2); Switzerland: Draft
Statute on Private International Law arts. 120-21, 42 RABELSZ 716, 739 (1978) (art. 115 of the
1982 version of the Draft Statute); see also Austrian Statute of 1978, § 36, BUNDESGESETZBLATT 1978, No. 304 at 1732-33.
60. 23 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 266) 1 (Oct. 9, 1980), art. 4 [hereinafter cited as Contract
Choice of Law Convention]. For discussion, in the context of an earlier draft, see d'Oliveira,
"Characteristic Obligation" in the Dreft EEC Obligation Convention, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 303
(1977).
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most cases the payment of money is not characteristic of the contract61 and,
as a result, does not have the close connection to the forum that is the premise underlying article 5(1). Adoption of a "characteristic obligation" approach62 by the European Court of Justice would have the advantage that
all litigation with respect to the contract would be concentrated at the place
where the characteristic obligation has to be performed. It is a separate
question whether the definition of this criterion should be left to national
courts or be undertaken by the Court itself. As stated initially, 63 the definition of jurisdictional standards for recognition purposes is a federal function. The Court should either undertake such a definition or, as in other
cases,64 perform its federal function through its oversight in referral cases.

B. Place of Peiformance
I. The National Law Interpretation: The Shortcomings of Tessili
Further uncertainty with respect to the interpretation of the "place of
performance" in article 5(1) adds to the confusion. In Tessi/iv. .Dunlop,65
tjie European Court of Justice held that that phrase is to be interpreted by
reference to the law applicable to the contract as determined by the conflicts
law of the forum. National laws differ considerably in their definition of
the place ofperformance.66 Thus, there was no way to find a common solution and the definition of a community rule may have been rejected as an
alternative because its substitution for the rules of national law may have
been considered inappropriately intrusive.67
A principal substantive argument advanced in support of the nationalapplicable-law approach of Tessi/i (the "lex causae" solution) is the concern
61. See E. ScoLES & P. HAY, supra note 4, at 696-98 and references cited therein.
62. Droz,supra note 57, at 125; Huet,Note, 104 CLUNET 714, 717 (1977); Linke,supra note
44, § 606, at 59; Spellenberg, supra note 44, at 56, 58.
63. See text at notes 23-27 supra.
64. See, e.g., Martin Peters Bauuntemehmung GmbH v. Zuid Nederlandse Aannemers
Vereniging (Case No. 34/82), 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 987 (Preliminary Ruling) (obligation
of a member of an unincorporated association to pay money is an obligation within the meaning of article 5(1) even if it derives from a decision by the association rather than from the
membership agreement). For criticism see the annotation by Schlosser, Europaisch-autonome
lnterpr~lation des Begr!lft "Vertrag oder Anspr/Jche aus einem Ver/rag" i.S. v. Ari. .5 Nr. 1
EuGVU?, 4 IPR.Ax 65 (1984).
65. Industrie Tessili Italiana Como v. Dunlop AG (Case No. 12/76), 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 1473 (Preliminary Ruling).
66. In Belgium (CODE CIVIL arts. 1247, 1609), Denmark (Lyngs~. supra note 54, at 121),
France (CODE CIVIL arts. 1247, 1609), Greece (CODE CIVIL art. 320), Germany (BGB § 269),
Italy (C. c. art. 1182(4)), the U.K. (see J. CHITTY, supra note 53, at~ 1419), and Ireland (Sale
of Goods Act § 29(2)), the place of performance for delivery of goods is at the debtor's domicile. In the Netherlands, goods have to be delivered at the creditor's domicile. B.W. arts.
1429(2), 1513. However, the determination of the domicile in point of time differs: it is the
domicile of the time of contract formation in Germany and the Netherlands, but the domicile
at the time of performance in Belgium, France and Italy. Special rules apply when goods are
unique. See generally ~~hlosser, Vertragsautonome Auslegung, nationa!es Recht, Rechtsver•
gleichung und das EuGVO, in GEDACHTNISSCHRIFf FUR RUDOLF BRUNS 45-56 (J. Baltzer, G.
Baumgartel, E. Peters & H. Pieper eds. 1980); Spellenberg, supra note 23, at 59.
67. Martiny, Autonome und Einheitliche Aus!egung im Europiiischen Internationa!en Zivil•
prozessrecht, 45 RABELSZ 427, 434 (1981).
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that an autonomous concept of the place of performance might lead to a
place which, in fact, differs from the real place of performance. In the view
of some authors, this would defeat the reason for providing an alternative
to domiciliary jurisdiction at the place where the performance of the obligation and any proceedings concerning it come together. 68 In addition, the
government of the United Kingdom maintained in its statement in Tessi!i 69
that a Community definition of the place of performance would, for practical purposes, determine that place as a matter of substantive law of contract, to be applied as such in all member states. Given existing differences
in national law, such a Community definition, the argument goes, could
result in a change in the law of some, perhaps all, of the member states.
The effect of the ruling would extend to all aspects of performance of contracts of the type in question and would have repercussions even beyond
the performance of the contract. It would extend to those other aspects of
the law that are directly or indirectly linked with performance. Moreover,
the question of where performance is to take place would call for a separate
answer for every type of contractual relationship, and would in every instance ultimately be a matter for referral to the Court of Justice. Serious
uncertainty would be introduced into the law.70
Adoption of a Community meaning need not affect substantive law.
Each state remains free to define the place of performance for substantive
law purposes.7 1 That, then, leaves the question of "harmony" between substantive law and the law of jurisdiction, on the one hand, and between
choice-of-law rules and the law of jurisdiction, on the other. There is, of
course, no magic - no necessity - in such harmony. The American experience (which indeed seems relevant72) shows that contacts for jurisdiction
may well differ from those relevant for the determination of the applicable
law.73 Moreover, it may well be - as the concluding comments will try to
show - that the elaboration of tight independent (Community level) jurisdictional standards may ultimately promote "harmony" between jurisdictional and applicable law. Standards in substantive law, finally, may still
differ from those in jurisdictional law. But if, as a result of "harmony"
between jurisdiction and applicable law, the forum neither has jurisdiction
68. See, e.g., R. GEIMER & R. SCHUTZE, 1 INTERNATIONALE URTEILSANERKENNUNG 563
(1983); Basedow,Europiiisches Zivilprozessrecht, in 1 H.J. HERRMANN, J. BASEDOW & J. KRoPH0LLER, HANDBUCH DES INTERNATIONALEN ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHTS § 45 (1982); Geimer,
Zur Auslegung des BrfJsseler Zustiindigkeits- und Vol/streckungsuhereinkommens in Zivil- und
Handelssachen vom 27 September 1968, 12 EuR 341, 356 (1977); Kropholler, Internationale
Zustiindigkeit, in 1 H.J. HERRMANN, J. BASED0W & J. KROPHOLLER, supra at§§ 670, 355
(1982); Schultsz, Zwischenhilanz des europiiischen Gerichtsstands- und Vollstreckungsiihereinkommens, 3 IPR.Ax 97, 99 (1983); Schlosser, supra note 66, at 57.
69. 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1479, 1480.
70. See also Schultsz, supra note 68, at 99; Schlosser, .Der EuGH und das Europiiische Gerichtsstands· und Vol/streckungslihereinkommen, 30 NJW 457, 459 (1977).
71. See Huet, supra note 62, at 716.
72. See text at notes 96-97 infra.
73. See Linke, supra note 44, at 51; Liideritz, Fremdhestimmte internationale Zusliindigkeit?, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR KONRAD ZWEIGERT 233, 241, 242 (H. Bernstein, u.
Drobnig & H. Ktltz eds. 1981); Submission of the Gov. of the Fed. Republic of Germany in
Tessili v. .Dunlop, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1477, 1479.
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nor furnishes the applicable law, what difference does the content of its
substantive law make in the particular case?
The history74 of article 5(1) shows that the choice of the place of performance was a compromise.75 This choice was made to introduce a stable
criterion for jurisdiction.76 The provisions will not achieve that objective
when the place of performance may point in as many different directions as a result of national law divergencies - as do the various definitions of
"obligation" discussed above. Instead, a "European answer" 77 is required.
2. Ivenel v. Schwab: A Change of Heart?
In Case 133/81,Ivenel v. Schwab, 18 the plaintiff, who resided in France,
sued his German employer in France for sums due, including commissions,
after his employment was terminated. Under .DeB!oos19 there should not
have been jurisdiction in France because the obligations - although there
were several - all ran from the defendant to the plaintiff and, under both
German and French law, 80 were payable at the debtor's address. The
Court of Justice observed that one purpose of article 5(1) was to give jurisdiction to a court with a close connection to the case, 81 added that article 6
74. "One case where 'travaux preparatoires' are regularly referred to is the 1968 Brussels
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters." Lord Mackenzie Stuart,lntroductory Talk, Visit of the Court of Human Rights, Luxem•
bourg, 29 April 1983, at 9 (mimeo).
75. Jenard, Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in
civil and commercial matters, 22 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 59) I, 23 (Mar. 5, 1979) [hereinafter
cited as Jenard Report]; G. DROZ, COMPETENCE JUDICIAIRE ET EFFETS DES JU0EMENTS DANS
LE MARCHE COMMUN: ETUDE DE LA CONVENTION DE BRUXELLES DU 27 SEPTEMBRE 1968, at
57, 58 (1972).
76. G. DROZ, supra note 75, at 57, 58; Linke, supra note 44, at 56; Linke,Anmerk1111g, 23
RIW / AWD 43, 44 (1977).
77. Pescatore, Le Recours, dons la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des Communautes
Europeennes, a des normes deduites de la comparaison des droits des etats membres, 32 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 337, 344 (1980); see also R. SCHUTZE, lNTERNATIO·
NALES ZIYILPROZESSRECHT 74 (1980); M. WESER, CONVENTION COMMUNAUTAIRE SUR LA
COMPETENCE JUDICIAIRE ET L'EXECUTION DES DECISIONS 248 (1975); Jeantet, Un droil
europeen des co,iflits de competence judiciaire et de /'execution des decision en maliere civile el
commerciale, 1972 CAH. DR. EUR. 375, 388.
78. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1891 (Preliminary Ruling). For discussion, see Mezger,
Einheillicher Gerichtsstand_~es ErjlJl/ungsorls verschiedenartiger Ansprliche eines Ha11delsvertrelers (Article 5 Nr. 1 GVlJ), 3 IPRAx 153 (1983).
79. (Case No. 14/76), 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1497.
80. McClellan & Kremlis, supra note 34, at 540.
81. The Court had made the same point in an interesting earlier decision. See Zeiger v.
Salinitri (Case No. 56/79), 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 89 (Preliminary Ruling). In this case,
the parties had agreed orally that Munich should be the place of performance. The question
was whether this agreement made for jurisdiction in Munich under article 5(1), even though
article 17 requires that forum selection clauses be in writing. The Court noted that article 17
permits the selection of any court, without regard to a connection between it and the transaction, while article 5(1) provides for jurisdiction at a place where there is a direct link to the
transaction. If the parties structure their transaction so as to bring about a close connection to
the particular place, the objectives of article 5(1) are fulfilled. The protection against over•
reaching that the formal requirements of article 17 provide then is no longer needed and jurisdiction may be exercised at the place of the (stipulated) performance.
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of the Contract Choice of Law Convention82 applies to employment contracts the law of the country where the employee habitually does his work,
and then concluded that for claims arising out of employment contracts, the
close connection for jurisdictional purposes is at the place whose law governs the contract. That law, in tum, "is determined by the obligation
characterising the contract ... and is normally the obligation to carry out
work." 83
Employment contracts have long had a special place in conflicts law,
perhaps even earlier in Europe than in the United States. This importance
was the result of concern over providing protection for the weaker party.
Experience has been similar in insurance contracts. However, by the same
token, there is something special about all contract types - hence the growing importance for choice-of-law purposes of the place where the characteristic obligation is to be performed. 84 Particularly for those who seek
"harmony" between jurisdiction and choice of law, 85 an interpretation of
article 5(1) along these lines should suggest itself as natural.
The suggestion, by implication, is that the Court should opt for the characteristic obligation approach in dealing with "obligation" and "place of
performance" under article 5(1). This is not the only possibility, of course.
The Court could also select one of the national rules, such as section 29 of
the German Code of Civil Procedure, which is said to have been a model
for article 5(1).86 However, suggestions in the literature87 favor the "characteristic obligation" approach, as does newer legislative reform. 88 Adoption of this approach would also have the advantage of eliminating from
the range of jurisdictional alternatives the place of payment of a money
debt. This effect is especially desirable when such payment is to occur at the
creditor's address since it would then also accord with the Convention's
objective to eliminate the forum actoris (exorbitant jurisdiction).89
All this said, however, it is important to remember that Ivene/90 was an
employment case and that, despite the generally applicable rationale which
underlies that decision, the Court of Justice has said nothing expressly that
would indicate a wider reach, let alone signal a general departure from (the
82. See note 60 supra.
83. lvenel, 1982 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. at 1900.
84. See notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text.
85. See notes 68 & 71 supra.
86. Jenard Report, supra note 75, at 23.
87. Linke,Anmerkung, supra note 76, at 45; Spellenberg, Die Vereinbarung des Erjhllungsortes und Article 5 Nr. I des Europaischen Gerichlsslands- und Vollstreckungsiibereinkommens, 3
IPR.Ax 75 (1981).
88. See note 59 supra.
89. Droz, supra note 57, at 125. See also Stoll, Gerichlsstand des E,jlillungsortes nach Art. 5
Nr. I EuGV[/ bei slrilligem Vertragsschluss, 3 IPRAx 52, 54 n.16a (1983) who notes the tendency of national courts to define jurisdiction at the place of performance as "a 'one-way
street' leading to the courts at the domicile of the plaintiff . . . ." [author's translation - Ed.).
Since the basic rule of the Convention (article 2) provides for jurisdiction at the debtor's domicile, "the exception of article 5(1) should not entail the result that, contrary to the basic rule,
the debtor may routinely be sued at the plaintiff's domicile for certain categories of contract
claims." Id. at 54 [author's translation - Ed.).
90. (Case No. 133/81), 1982 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1891; see text at note 78 supra.
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"overruling" of) .DeB/oos.91 Indeed, Ivene/ has been criticized: "[T]he
.DeB!oos decision appears to be the most realistic in the light of the wording
of article 5(1) ['... the place of performance of the obligation in question')
which makes no distinction between contracts of employment and other
contracts." 92 True, but neither does the wording require that the definition
of "obligation" and "place of performance" be determined by national law.
Instead, the suggestion is that the characteristic obligation approach, qua
Community definition, be extended beyond employment contracts.
Ill.

CONCLUSION

Advocate-General Warner gave an impressive list in his submissions in
a 1980 case93 of the many instances in which the Court has opted for an
independent interpretation. In general, that trend continues. 94 This is as it
should be if the legal integration, which article 220 of the EEC Treaty and,
in implementation, the Brussels Convention have as their objective, is to be
achieved. 95
Both the United States and the Community are non-unified legal systems. Beyond the subject matter of delegated federal (Community) powers
or those areas touching upon federal concems,96 there is no general lawmaking power on the federal level, either for making substantive private
law or for establishing choice-of-law rules. With respect to the latter, there
are some minimal federal constitutional limitations in the United States. 97
Even these do not exist in the Community to the same extent. An earlier
attempt to unify choice-of-law rules for tort and contract by convention
failed, 98 and the current (1980) convention unifying only contracts choiceof-law rules has, so far, received only one ratification (France). 99
It is against this background of substantive and conflicts law divergence
that jurisdictional standards must receive federal/Community-level defini91. (Case No. 14/76), 1976 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1497.
92. McClellan & Kremlis, supra note 34, at 542.
93. Netherlands State v. Ruffer (Case No. 814/79), 1980 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 3807, 3833
(Preliminary·Ruling).
94. See Ivenel v. Schwab (Case No. 133/81), 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. l891;seealso text
at notes 78-83 supra.
95. See Linke, Anmerkung, supra note 76, at 44.
96. When federal concerns are implicated, the United States federal courts have limited
power to make co=on law. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 4, at 133-48. The existence and
extent of similar power in the Court of Justice, as distinguished from the legislative selfa.mendment possibility offered by EEC Treaty, supra note 6, art. 235, is at best uncertain and,
in any event, largely unexplored. But there are beginnings: "[The decision in AM & S Europe
Limited v. Co=ission (Case 155/79), 1982 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1575] is . . . important •..
also for the reason that, I think for the the first time, the Court, having deduced an unwritten
principle of Co=unity law from a study of the comparative law of the Member States, has
invoked it to limit the application of what would otherwise be the unqualified terms of a
Co=unity regulation . . . ." Lord Mackenzie Stuart, supra note 74, at 13; see also Goffin,
Observations [on the AM & S Case], 18 CAH. DR. EUR. 391, 394, 405 (1982).
97. See Hay, Reflections on Conflict-of-Laws Methodology, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1644 (1981).
98. Unofficial translation in 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 587 (1973); see EUROPEAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OBLIGATION (0. Lando, B. von Hoffmann & K. Siehr eds. 1975).
99. Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, 80/934/EEC, 23 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 266) I (Oct. 9, 1980).
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tion, if there is to be a basis for mandatory recognition and enforcement of
judgments. Litigation at the place of the closest connection will prevent
forum shopping, just as uniform substantive and conflicts law will lead to
predictable results. To accomplish these aims, however, the definition of
the jurisdictional standards cannot be left to the individual units that are to
be integrated.
Will the suggested federal/Community-level definition of jurisdictional
standards then result in a greater, and perhaps undesirable, divergence between them and choice-of-law standards? In the United States, minimal
contacts to the forum have been accepted for the sake of the plaintiff's convenience in the choice of forum. In a system with a federal due process
prescription it should follow - but has not as fully as some would wish that a much closer connection of the forum to the transaction or the parties
should be required before the forum may apply its own law. 100 Europe
lacks this kind of express due process provision. The Jurisdiction and Recognition Convention, however, provides an analogue: specific jurisdictional provisions to be interpreted on the Community level. An evolution
of a jurisdictional standard that localizes litigation at the place of the closest
connection or the characteristic obligation should, in logic, often lead to the
application of forum law. If national choice-of-law rules continue to evolve
toward similar tests (even without the benefit of a Choice-of-Law Convention), Europe may have a measure of harmony between choice-of-law and
judicial jurisdiction long before the United States.

100. See Hay, supra note 97.

